North America During the Great Recession: Calculating the Severity Index in States, Provinces, and US Counties
 |
| Maximum GDP decline in Real GDP per capita during the Global Financial Crisis; for more detail, see Annex C1 below |
This analysis is based on independent work I conducted over 2016 and 2017 and updated in June 2018, using the most recent data available at that time. (I thank Jim Haley for his helpful comments.) The views expressed here are entirely my own. A PDF version is available here.
I intend to update this piece in late 2022, when American, Canadian, and IMF GDP figures will be available for 2021.
Abstract
Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff have
developed a “Severity Index” to describe the effects of financial crises. For a
given country, the Severity Index is the sum of the maximum percentage point decline
in real GDP per capita and the number of years it takes real GDP per capita to
return to its pre-crisis peak.
Extending Reinhart
and Rogoff’s approach to the domestic level, the Severity Index can be calculated
for individual US states, Canadian provinces, and US counties. Using data from the
2007-08 Global Financial Crisis, local Severity Indexes reveal sharp
differences across North America. While some states and provinces experienced real
GDP per capita declines below the national average, others vastly exceeded it.
Indeed, some states and provinces have Severity Indexes on the same scale as
Greece and Italy. Moreover, even as of 2017, numerous states, counties, and
provinces still had not returned to their pre-crisis levels of RGDPPC. The
worst-affected regions include the Southeastern and Southwestern United States,
and Newfoundland and Labrador (by far the worst-affected Canadian
province).
The wide variation
in the effects of the crisis suggests that federal support should be carefully
tailored to local circumstances. Blanket national approaches might be less effective,
by failing to target the worst-off areas.
Introduction and Definitions
In their 2009 book, This
Time Is Different, Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff analyze the effects
of financial crises. They returned to the subject in a 2014 paper[1]
and Reinhart addressed the topic again in an op-ed in early 2016.[2]
In the former, they contend, “A significant part of the costs of [financial]
crises lies in the protracted and halting nature of the recovery.”[3]
In this regard, Reinhart and Rogoff focus on changes in real
GDP per capita (RGDPPC), arguing that it can be viewed as a proxy for
productivity and that it is more reflective of the experience of individual
citizens than real GDP growth. (For example, in a country with robust
population growth, while RGDP is rising, RGDPPC might be falling.) Finally,
RGDPPC data is widely available for many jurisdictions, including the IMF World Economic Outlook database and US
and Canadian official data.
In their analysis, Reinhart and Rogoff cite three ways that
RGDPPC changes during an economic slowdown, terming these “the three D’s”[4]:
- The depth of the decline (the change in RGDPPC from the pre-recessionary maximum to the recessionary minimum, i.e., peak to trough)
- The duration of the decline (the time it takes for RGDPPC to return to its pre-recessionary peak)
- The number of dips (whether RGDPPC falls more than once before it returns to its pre-recessionary peak)
The first
two “D’s” are used to compute the Severity Index (SI), which is defined as:
- Depth (in basis points) + Duration (in years) = Severity Index
Though the number of dips does not factor in the calculation,
more dips are usually associated with a higher Severity Index.
The calculation of the Severity Index can be illustrated
with the early 1990s slowdown in the province of British Columbia:
- Depth: RGDPPC fell 3.5% over 1989 to 1991
- Duration: It returned to its 1989 level in 1999 (after 10 years)
- Dips: It rose over 1991-93, but fell again in 1994-96 (double dip)
Hence, the Severity
Index for this episode is 3.5% + 10 years = 13.5
Of note, British Columbia’s real GDP saw no decline during this period—hence, an indicator based on real GDP growth would miss this episode.
Figure 1: RGDPPC in British Columbia, 1987-2000
Source: Statistics Canada tables 36-10-0222-01 (real GDP) & 17-10-0005-01 (population)
International Applications of the Severity Index
Reinhart and Rogoff stress that the Severity Index is
relevant only when a country undergoes a serious financial crisis. The example
above (British Columbia in the 1980s) does not meet this definition. However, the
concept can arguably be extended to any period in which RGDPPC declines, as a
way of measuring the effects of any slowdown. This analysis will adopt this
more liberal approach, calculating that the Severity Index at the local level
in the United States and Canada.
Before
turning to North America, a comparison with Europe is instructive. In
her 2016 op-ed, Reinhart calculates the Severity Index for several countries in
the wake of the 2007-08 Global Financial Crisis. The results are depressing, as
they reveal that in many Euro Area countries—notably, Italy, Cyprus, and
Greece—RGDPPC still has not returned to levels enjoyed before the Global
Financial Crisis. Even in other countries that did not experience as sharp a
decline in RGDPPC, the Severity Index can still be high, given the long
duration of the recovery.
Annex A contains heat maps that show the maximum decline in
RGDPPC as well as the Severity Index across Europe. Annex B contains a chart
showing the historical decline in RGDPPC and a table computing the Severity
Index for the Euro Area and the UK. These provide a point of reference for analysis
of North American regions.
The Severity Index in the United States
States and Regions
The Bureau
of Economic Analysis provides RGDPPC for every US state as well as eight regional
groupings of states. Computing the Severity Index in the wake of the
2007-08 Global Financial Crisis.
At the regional level, the recovery was uneven: the “Mideast” (Mid-Atlantic)
region saw the smallest decline in RGDPPC and the quickest recovery, followed
by the Great Plains. In contrast, by 2013, the US as a whole and five of its
regions still had not recovered. As of 2016, the Rocky Mountain states had just
barely returned to pre-crisis RGDPPC and the Southeast still had not recovered.
In general,
these patterns persist at the state level, with Southeastern and Rocky Mountain
states showing sharp declines. Some Northeastern states, such as Connecticut
and Delaware, also show above-average declines. In contrast, the best performers
include the Dakotas, Maryland, and West Virginia.
The worst performers
include both urban (Rhode Island) and rural (Maine) states, manufacturing (Indiana)
and agricultural (Mississippi) states, and are scattered across most of the
country. This implies that the effects of the Global Financial Crisis were not
concentrated in a particular region, or particularly severe for a certain type
of economy. A possible explanation for this geographic dispersion is the different
policy responses enacted by the various states in limiting the economic fallout.
These were independent of geography, driven by pre-existing institutional
structures, state resources, and local political preferences.
Please see
Annex C for heat maps of US States (alongside Canadian Provinces and
Territories) and Annex D for a chart showing the historical decline in
RGDPPC across regions, as well as tables computing the Severity Index for
regions and states.
Counties
For a
deeper level of granularity, it is possible to extend the Severity Index
methodology to individual US counties; however, county-level data is only
available for real personal income per capita (RPIPC) instead of RGDPPC. This
is not a radical difference, as the fundamental concept remains the same:
changes in RPIPC are a proxy for how individuals experience economic downturns.
In general,
counties in the Rocky Mountains, Florida, and central United States experienced
the largest declines in RPIPC. Examining the Severity Index reveals a patchwork
of counties where RPIPC still has not returned to its pre-crisis peak. This is
most concentrated in the extreme Southeast (including North Carolina, Florida
and the Gulf Coast), southern Illinois, western North Dakota, the central
Rockies, and the Southwest. Of note, several of the non-recovered areas (including
in South Dakota, Utah, Arizona, and New Mexico) are home to large American Indian
Reservations.[5]
This
general pattern is consistent with that at the state level: the hardest-hit
counties are scattered around the country, generally in rural areas.
Please see
Annex E for heat maps of US counties, computed in terms of real personal
income.
The Severity Index in Canada’s Provinces & Territories
Using data
from Statistics Canada, the Severity Index can be calculated for each of
Canada’s provinces and territories. As in the United States, there were major
differences across the country during the Global Financial Crisis. The
provinces can be sorted into three groups: Severity Indexes are low in the
east, higher in Ontario and British Columbia, and highest in the oil producing
provinces.
On the East
Coast, the Maritime provinces (Prince Edward Island [PEI], Nova Scotia, and
New Brunswick), as well as Manitoba and Quebec, experienced only minor declines
in RGDPPC (below 2.0%.) Most of these provinces also experienced rapid
recoveries. Only New Brunswick experienced a prolonged period of RGDPPC
stagnation, with a double dip recession. Of note, all these provinces are
longstanding beneficiaries of Canada’s equalization program, and thus received
transfers from the federal government throughout the downturn.[6]
Ontario and
British Columbia, Canada’s first- and third-most populous provinces, have
Severity Indexes that roughly match the national average (a not unexpected
result, especially given Ontario’s population.) What is particularly striking
is how closely Ontario’s experience mirrors that of the United States (with a decline
of a similar scale and a matching recovery year), underscoring the province’s
strong economic links south of the border.
The Global
Financial Crisis had its most profound effects in Canada’s three oil-producing
provinces: Alberta, Saskatchewan, and NL.[7]
Declines in RGDPPC in these provinces exceeded the national average. Alberta’s
decline began in 2006, first in the country, and Saskatchewan experienced a
double dip decline starting in 2007. No sooner had the two western provinces
returned to pre-crisis RGDPPC levels than the 2014 fall in oil prices caused new
declines in RGDPPC. As of 2016, when the most recent RGDP data is available,
Alberta was on track to experience an RGDPPC decline on a similar scale as
during the Global Financial Crisis, and Saskatchewan a decline of a slightly
smaller scale.
NL deserves
special attention: between 2007 and 2009, RGDPPC fell 12.7%, the sharpest
decline among the provinces. Alone among Canada’s provinces, NL’s RGDPPC still
has not returned to its pre-crisis level. Though a partial recovery lasted
until 2011, a second dip ended this in 2012. Falling oil prices provoked a
third dip in 2014. NL’s decline is on the scale of Italy.
None of the
three oil-producing provinces receives any federal transfers through equalization,
and none are projected to receive any until 2020 at the earliest, if ever.
Data for Canada’s
three territories shows a massive collapse in the Northwest Territories,
similar to NL’s. Nunavut experienced declines in 2009 and 2013, and Yukon did
in 2014. However, given the extremely low populations of the three territories,
these results may be exaggerated. Small changes in the local economy, or shifts
in population, can have a significant impact on territorial RGDPPC.
Please see Annex
F for a chart showing the historical decline in RGDPPC across Canada’s
Provinces and Territories, as well as tables computing the Severity Index for
the Global Financial Crisis as well as the 2013/14 decline. Heat maps of
Canada’s provinces and territories appear in Annex D.
Conclusion
Reinhart and Rogoff’s Severity Index can be employed to
analyze the effects of the Global Financial Crisis across North America. The
wide variation in the effects of the crisis suggests that federal support (or
state-level support, in the case of counties) should be carefully tailored by locality.
Blanket national approaches may not be an effective response to economic crises,
as resources will be directed to areas that do not need them: instead, relief
should be targeted in areas with the highest priority.
There are limitations to this approach, notably the
arbitrariness of most geographic boundaries. In large states and provinces,
vastly different areas must be averaged together to compute state- or
province-level RGDPPC. Though this is less of a problem at the county level, a
different problem arises there: namely, lower populations may be associated
with noisier data.
This paper suggests a potential area for further research,
namely, whether declines in RGDPPC or RPIPC affect political preferences.
Moreover, county-level RPIPC data could be compared with other indicators (such
as unemployment levels, educational attainment, racial composition, health
indicators, etc.) to map levels of economic and social strain in the United
States.
Annex A: Heat Maps for Europe
A1: Heat Map for Europe: Maximum Depth of RGDPPC Decline, 2006-23*
Shading by Quartile
0.4% (Minimum)
|
4.5%
|
6.5%
|
10.0%
|
26.3% (Maximum)
|
Blue: Country where RGDPPC did not decline.
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database, April 2018 edition. Map template adapted from Wikimedia Commons.
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database, April 2018 edition. Map template adapted from Wikimedia Commons.
*Note: The IMF has projected RGDPPC to 23.
A2: Heat Map for Europe: Severity Index, 2006-23*
Shading by Quartile
2.4 (Minimum)
|
9.6
|
12.5
|
17.6
|
33.8 (Maximum)
|
Blue: Country where RGDPPC did not decline and
the Severity Index is therefore zero.
Black: Country
not expected to return to pre-crisis RGDPPC before 2023*
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database, April 2018 edition.
Map template adapted from Wikimedia Commons.
*Note: The IMF has projected RGDPPC to 2023.
Annex B: Data for the Euro Area & the UK
B1: Change in RGDPPC versus pre-crisis peak, 2006-16: Euro Area & UK
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database, April 2018 edition.
B2: Severity Index Calculation: Euro Area & UK
Dips
|
Depth
|
Duration
(Start)
|
Duration (End)
|
Severity Index
|
|
Austria
|
1
|
-4.0%
|
2008
|
2011
|
7.0
|
Belgium
|
2
|
-3.0%
|
2008
|
2015
|
10.0
|
Cyprus
|
1
|
-18.8%
|
2008
|
2023
|
33.8
|
Estonia
|
1
|
-18.9%
|
2007
|
2015
|
26.9
|
Finland
|
2
|
-8.7%
|
2008
|
2020
|
20.7
|
France
|
2
|
-3.8%
|
2007
|
2015
|
11.8
|
Germany
|
1
|
-5.2%
|
2008
|
2011
|
8.2
|
Greece
|
1
|
-26.3%
|
2007
|
Beyond 2023
|
> 42.3
|
Ireland
|
2
|
-10.5%
|
2007
|
2014
|
17.5
|
Italy
|
2
|
-11.9%
|
2007
|
Beyond 2023
|
> 27.9
|
Latvia
|
1
|
-17.4%
|
2007
|
2014
|
24.4
|
Lithuania
|
1
|
-13.9%
|
2008
|
2012
|
17.9
|
Luxembourg
|
2
|
-8.9%
|
2007
|
2018
|
19.9
|
Malta
|
1
|
-3.2%
|
2008
|
2011
|
6.2
|
Netherlands
|
2
|
-4.3%
|
2008
|
2016
|
12.3
|
Portugal
|
2
|
-7.0%
|
2008
|
2017
|
16.0
|
Slovakia
|
1
|
-5.5%
|
2008
|
2011
|
8.5
|
Slovenia
|
2
|
-11.7%
|
2008
|
2017
|
20.7
|
Spain
|
1
|
-10.6%
|
2007
|
2017
|
20.6
|
United
Kingdom
|
1
|
-6.1%
|
2007
|
2015
|
14.1
|
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database, April 2018 edition.
Annex C: Heat Maps for States, Provinces & Territories
C1: Heat Map for States, Provinces & Territories: Maximum Depth of RGDPPC Decline, 2006-16
Shading by Quartile
0.1% (Minimum)
|
3.5%
|
5.5%
|
8.1%
|
25.2% (Maximum)
|
Sources: Source: Statistics Canada tables 36-10-0222-01 (real GDP)
& 17-10-0005-01 (population), US Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional
Product Division. Map template adapted from Wikimedia Commons
C2: Heat Map for States, Provinces & Territories: Severity Index, 2006-16
Shading by Quartile
2.1 (Minimum)
|
5.2
|
9.6
|
12.7
|
25.5 (Maximum)
|
Black: area had
not returned to pre-crisis RGDPPC as of 2016
Sources: Source: Statistics Canada tables 36-10-0222-01 (real GDP) & 17-10-0005-01 (population), US Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional Product Division. Map template adapted from Wikimedia Commons.
Annex D: Data for US States & Regions
D1: Change in RGDPPC versus pre-crisis peak, 2006-16: US Regions
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional Product Division
D2: Severity Index Calculation: US Regions
Dips
|
Depth
|
Duration
(Start)
|
Duration (End)
|
Severity Index
|
|
United States
|
1
|
-5.0%
|
2007
|
2014
|
12.0
|
New England
|
2
|
-3.9%
|
2007
|
2015
|
11.9
|
Mideast
|
1
|
-1.8%
|
2007
|
2010
|
4.8
|
Great Lakes
|
1
|
-7.3%
|
2007
|
2014
|
14.3
|
Plains
|
1
|
-3.0%
|
2008
|
2011
|
6.0
|
Southeast
|
2
|
-7.4%
|
2006
|
Beyond 2016
|
> 17.4
|
Southwest
|
1
|
-5.1%
|
2007
|
2012
|
10.1
|
Rocky Mountain
|
2
|
-5.6%
|
2007
|
2015
|
13.6
|
Far West
|
1
|
-5.8%
|
2007
|
2015
|
13.8
|
Source: US Bureau of
Economic Analysis, Regional Product Division
D3: Severity Index Calculation: US States
Dips
|
Depth
|
Duration
(Start)
|
Duration (End)
|
Severity Index
|
|
Alabama
|
2
|
-6.3%
|
2006
|
Beyond 2016
|
> 16.3
|
Alaska
|
1
|
-3.7%
|
2009
|
2012
|
6.7
|
Arizona
|
2
|
-14.1%
|
2007
|
Beyond 2016
|
> 23.1
|
Arkansas
|
2
|
-5.5%
|
2006
|
2013
|
12.5
|
California
|
1
|
-6.2%
|
2007
|
2014
|
13.2
|
Colorado
|
1
|
-5.4%
|
2007
|
2014
|
12.4
|
Connecticut
|
1
|
-11.5%
|
2007
|
Beyond 2016
|
> 20.5
|
Delaware
|
3
|
-10.5%
|
2006
|
Beyond 2016
|
> 20.5
|
District
of Columbia
|
2
|
-6.8%
|
2008
|
Beyond 2016
|
> 14.8
|
Florida
|
1
|
-14.1%
|
2006
|
Beyond 2016
|
> 24.1
|
Georgia
|
1
|
-11.7%
|
2005
|
Beyond 2016
|
> 22.7
|
Hawaii
|
2
|
-5.3%
|
2007
|
2016
|
14.3
|
Idaho
|
1
|
-8.0%
|
2007
|
Beyond 2016
|
> 17.0
|
Illinois
|
2
|
-5.7%
|
2007
|
2014
|
12.7
|
Indiana
|
1
|
-8.1%
|
2007
|
2014
|
15.1
|
Iowa
|
1
|
-4.9%
|
2007
|
2012
|
9.9
|
Kansas
|
2
|
-5.0%
|
2008
|
2014
|
11.0
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
-6.8%
|
2006
|
Beyond 2016
|
> 16.8
|
Louisiana
|
2
|
-11.1%
|
2006
|
Beyond 2016
|
> 21.1
|
Maine
|
2
|
-4.5%
|
2006
|
Beyond 2016
|
> 14.5
|
Maryland
|
1
|
-0.7%
|
2008
|
2010
|
2.7
|
Massachusetts
|
1
|
-2.9%
|
2007
|
2011
|
6.9
|
Michigan
|
1
|
-14.5%
|
2005
|
2016
|
25.5
|
Minnesota
|
1
|
-6.4%
|
2005
|
2014
|
15.4
|
Mississippi
|
3
|
-5.9%
|
2008
|
Beyond 2016
|
> 13.9
|
Missouri
|
2
|
-3.5%
|
2008
|
Beyond 2016
|
> 11.5
|
Montana
|
1
|
-3.7%
|
2007
|
2011
|
7.7
|
Nebraska
|
1
|
-1.4%
|
2011
|
2013
|
3.4
|
Nevada
|
1
|
-21.4%
|
2006
|
Beyond 2016
|
> 31.4
|
New
Hampshire
|
1
|
-3.3%
|
2006
|
2013
|
10.3
|
New
Jersey
|
2
|
-6.2%
|
2007
|
Beyond 2016
|
> 15.2
|
New
Mexico
|
1
|
-3.8%
|
2008
|
2015
|
10.8
|
New York
|
1
|
-2.5%
|
2007
|
2010
|
5.5
|
North
Carolina
|
3
|
-8.2%
|
2006
|
Beyond 2016
|
> 18.2
|
North
Dakota
|
1
|
-0.6%
|
2012
|
2014
|
2.6
|
Ohio
|
1
|
-6.9%
|
2005
|
2012
|
13.9
|
Oklahoma
|
1
|
-4.4%
|
2008
|
2012
|
8.4
|
Oregon
|
1
|
-2.0%
|
2008
|
2010
|
4.0
|
Pennsylvania
|
1
|
-3.3%
|
2008
|
2011
|
6.3
|
Rhode
Island
|
2
|
-6.2%
|
2006
|
Beyond 2016
|
> 16.2
|
South
Carolina
|
2
|
-7.3%
|
2007
|
Beyond 2016
|
> 16.3
|
South
Dakota
|
1
|
-0.1%
|
2008
|
2010
|
2.1
|
Tennessee
|
1
|
-7.3%
|
2006
|
2015
|
16.3
|
Texas
|
1
|
-3.9%
|
2007
|
2012
|
8.9
|
Utah
|
2
|
-8.4%
|
2007
|
Beyond 2016
|
> 17.4
|
Vermont
|
1
|
-2.2%
|
2008
|
2010
|
4.2
|
Virginia
|
2
|
-3.8%
|
2006
|
Beyond 2016
|
> 13.8
|
Washington
|
2
|
-5.6%
|
2007
|
2015
|
13.6
|
West
Virginia
|
1
|
-0.3%
|
2008
|
2010
|
2.3
|
Wisconsin
|
1
|
-5.1%
|
2006
|
2013
|
12.1
|
Wyoming
|
1
|
-14.2%
|
2008
|
Beyond 2016
|
> 22.2
|
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional Product Division
Annex E: Heat Maps for US Counties
E1: Heat Map for US Counties: Maximum Depth of Real Personal Income Per Capita Decline, 2006-16
Shading by Quartile
0.0% (Minimum)
|
1.9%
|
3.8%
|
6.7%
|
63.8% (Maximum)
|
Blue: County where RPIPC did not decline.
Sources: US Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional Income Division, US Federal Reserve Economic Data (implicit price deflator, annual, not seasonally adjusted / USAGDPDEFAISMEI.) Map template adapted from Wikimedia Commons.
E2: Heat Map for US Counties: Severity Index (based on Real Personal Income Per Capita), 2006-16
Shading by Quartile
1.0 (Minimum)
|
4.4
|
7.3
|
11.8
|
71.8 (Maximum)
|
Blue: County where RPIPC did not decline.
Black: County that
has not yet returned to pre-crisis RPIPC
Sources: US Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional Income Division, US Federal Reserve Economic Data (implicit price deflator, annual, not seasonally adjusted / USAGDPDEFAISMEI.) Map template adapted from Wikimedia Commons.
Annex F: Data for Canadian Provinces & Territories
F1: Change in RGDPPC versus pre-crisis peak, 2006-16: Canada
Source: Statistics Canada tables 36-10-0222-01 (real GDP) &
17-10-0005-01 (population)
F2: Severity Index Calculation: Canada, Global Financial Crisis
Dips
|
Depth
|
Duration
(Start)
|
Duration (End)
|
Severity Index
|
|
Canada
|
1
|
-4.1%
|
2007
|
2012
|
9.1
|
Newfoundland
and Labrador
|
3
|
-12.7%
|
2007
|
Beyond 2016
|
> 21.7
|
Prince
Edward Island
|
1
|
-0.5%
|
2008
|
2010
|
2.5
|
Nova
Scotia
|
1
|
-1.1%
|
2011
|
2014
|
4.1
|
New
Brunswick
|
2
|
-1.8%
|
2008
|
2015
|
8.8
|
Quebec
|
1
|
-1.9%
|
2008
|
2013
|
6.9
|
Ontario
|
1
|
-4.9%
|
2006
|
2014
|
12.9
|
Manitoba
|
1
|
-1.0%
|
2008
|
2010
|
3.0
|
Saskatchewan
|
2
|
-6.9%
|
2008
|
2013
|
11.9
|
Alberta
|
1
|
-9.2%
|
2006
|
2013
|
16.2
|
British
Columbia
|
1
|
-4.4%
|
2007
|
2012
|
9.4
|
Yukon
|
0
|
0%
|
NA
|
NA
|
NA
|
Northwest Territories
|
2
|
-25.2%
|
2007
|
Beyond 2016
|
> 34.2
|
Nunavut
|
1
|
-9.0%
|
2008
|
2010
|
11.0
|
Source: Statistics Canada tables 36-10-0222-01 (real GDP) &
17-10-0005-01 (population)
F3: Severity Index Calculation: Canada, 2014 Oil Crash
These provinces and territories all experienced fresh
declines in RGDPPC after 2013.
Dips
|
Depth
|
Duration
(Start)
|
Duration (End)
|
Severity Index
|
|
Newfoundland
and Labrador*
|
1
|
-2.8%
|
2013
|
Beyond 2016
|
> 5.8
|
Prince
Edward Island
|
1
|
-0.2%
|
2013
|
2015
|
2.2
|
Saskatchewan
|
1
|
-3.9%
|
2014
|
Beyond 2016
|
> 5.9
|
Alberta
|
1
|
-10.0%
|
2014
|
Beyond 2016
|
> 12.0
|
Yukon
|
1
|
-9.4%
|
2013
|
Beyond 2016
|
> 12.4
|
Nunavut
|
1
|
-5.1%
|
2013
|
Beyond 2016
|
> 8.1
|
*A fresh phase of its ongoing contraction starting in 2007
(see above.)
Source: Statistics Canada tables 36-10-0222-01 (real GDP) &
17-10-0005-01 (population)
[1] Carmen
Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff. “Recovery from Financial Crises: Evidence from 100
Episodes.” American
Economic Review:
Papers & Proceedings 2014, 104(5): 50–55
[2]
Carmen Reinhart, “The Post-Crisis Economy’s Long Debt Hangover.” Project Syndicate, April 21, 2016.
[3]
Reinhart and Rogoff, 2014, p. 50
[4]
Reinhart and Rogoff, 2014, p. 51
[5]
For a visual comparison, please consult the “American Indian Reservations Map,”
based on census data.
[6]
Federal transfers to Provinces and Territories are listed here.
[7]
Alberta and Saskatchewan are home to Canada’s oil sands, while NL produces oil
offshore in the Atlantic Ocean.